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After the initial contributions of Radner (1968) and Prescott-Townsend (1984),
the analysis of competitive equilibria of economies with asymmetric information
has recently received renewed attention. For such economies the interaction be-
tween the private information dimension (e.g. the unobservable action in the
moral hazard case) and the observability of agents' trades plays a crucial role,
since trades have typically informational content over the agents' private infor-
mation. In particular, to decentralize incentive e±cient Pareto optimal allocations
the availability of fully exclusive contracts, i.e. of contracts whose terms (price
and payo®) depend on the transactions in all other markets of the agent trad-
ing the contract, is generally required. The implementation of these contracts
imposes typically the very strong informational requirement that all trades of an
agent need to be observed.
We do observe though agents engaging in di®erent contractual relationships
(e.g. having loans both from banks and credit card companies, holding various
insurance policies,...). It is then of interest to analyze also situations where con-
tracts traded are necessarily non-exclusive, because perfect monitoring of trades
is not available. The case of complete anonymity of trades, where no transaction
of the agents is observable, constitutes an important benchmark in this respect.
In the framework of a Walrasian competitive equilibrium model, alternative
assumptions on the observability of agents' trades may be captured in a reduced
form by alternative assumptions on the possible non-linearities of equilibrium
prices. Complete observability of trades (exclusivity) is captured by allowing
price schedules to be arbitrary non-linear function of agents' trades; at the other
extreme, complete anonimity of trades (full non-exclusivity) corresponds to re-
stricting price schedules to be a linear function of trades. The intermediate case
in which only short and long trading positions can be distinguished, which will
turn out to be central in our analysis, is captured by price schedules characterized
by distinct bid and ask prices.
The existence of competitive equilibria with linear prices has been recently in-
vestigated by Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1995), Bisin and Gottardi (1998),
Bisin, Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli and Polemarchakis (1998). It is shown that,
with asymmetric information, a minimal form of non-linearity, i.e. the possibility
of having a di®erent price for buyers and sellers (a bid-ask spread), is necessary
(in fact also su±cient) for competitive equilibria to exist. Existence of competi-
2tive equilibria with general non-linear price schedules for asymmetric information
economies has been studied by Prescott-Townsend (1984).1
To better evaluate the informational requirements and the structure of mar-
kets implicit in these competitive equilibrium notions, it is important to examine
the conditions under which such equilibria can be obtained as the limit, as the
number of strategic traders gets large, of the Nash equilibria of a game (where
information and strategy sets are explicitly modelled). In this paper we consider
a simple economy with moral hazard (i.e. where agents undertake a possibly
unobservable action), and examine whether, for di®erent assumptions about the
observability of agents' trades, the (Nash) equilibria of economies where strategic
¯nancial intermediaries compete by issuing contracts converge, as the number of
intermediaries gets large, to competitive equilibria.
With symmetric information the equilibria of the model with strategic inter-
mediaries always converge, no matter what is the information available to inter-
mediaries over agents' trades, to competitive equilibria with linear prices. In the
presence of asymmetric information, with complete observability of trades (i.e.
when intermediaries are able to implement exclusive contracts) convergence also
holds: the Nash equilibria converge, in this case to the (incentive e±cient) compet-
itive equilibria with fully non-linear prices2. On the other hand, when information
over agents' trades is more limited, convergence is not always ensured.
We consider in particular the case in which each intermediary cannot observe
any of the trades agents make with other intermediaries, nor whether agents en-
gage in re-trading fractions of the contracts they purchased (or sold) from them.
Intermediaries are only able to monitor the transactions each agent makes with
them; hence the only restrictions they can implement are restrictions preventing
agents from buying multiple units of the contracts they issue. In such a situation
while, as we already argued, when agents' e®ort is commonly observed (i.e. in-
formation is symmetric) equilibria converge to competitive equilibria with linear
prices, the same is not true with asymmetric information. More precisely, we will
show that there exists an open set of parameter values describing the economy for
which we do not have convergence: the (Nash) equilibria with strategic interme-
1More precisely, in Prescott-Townsend (1984) the speci¯cation of agents' budget sets restricts
admissible trades to lie in the set of incentive compatible trades, which is equivalent in their
set-up to allowing general non-linear price schedules; see also Lisboa (1996).
2The incentive e±ciency of equilibria with competing intermediaries, when exclusive con-
tracts are available, has been shown by Bennardo (1997) for an economy with moral hazard
which include as a special case the one considered here.
3diaries do not converge to any of the competitive equilibria with bid-ask spreads
(i.e. to the competitive equilibria exhibiting the informationally least demanding
form of non-linearity which ensures existence). In other words, the ability of in-
termediaries to prevent agents from buying multiple units of the contracts they
issue interacts with the asymmetry of information (the unobservability of agents'
e®ort choices) to generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts. Thus
the source of the di±culties for convergence is the combination of the presence of
asymmetric information and the restrictions on the observability of trades which
prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationships.
Finally, we show that convergence to competitive equilibria with bid-ask spreads
again obtains if we assume that each intermediary is unable to observe even the
total amount of trades an agent is making with him, and hence cannot prevent
the agent from buying multiples of the contracts he issues.
Non much work exists on convergence to competitive equilibria in economies
with asymmetric information. It is noteworthy though that, for a particular class
of economies with adverse selection, Biais-Martimort-Rochet (1997) obtain con-
vergence of the equilibria with strategic intermediaries to competitive equilibria
with bid-ask spreads also when intermediaries can prevent agents from buying
multiple units of the contracts they issue.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the economy
and de¯ne competitive equilibria as well as the equilibria of the game played by
¯nancial intermediaries. Convergence is analyzed in section 3. It is ¯rst shown
that convergence holds when information is symmetric (Proposition 1) as well as
in the case of complete observability of trades (Proposition 2) and no observability
of trades (Proposition 3). The following result (Propositions 4) shows that, when
information over trades allows intermediaries to prevent multiple trades by the
same agent, convergence to competitive equilibria with bid ask spreads fails.
2. The Economy
We consider an economy where asymmetric information is of the moral hazard
(hidden action) type. There are countably many agents, all ex-ante identical;
agents are indexed by n 2 N. There are two periods, t = 0;1; and a sin-
gle consumption good. Consumption only takes place at t = 1. Uncertainty
is purely idiosyncratic, and is described by the collection of random variables
(~ sn)n2N; assumed to be identically and independently distributed, with support
4S = fH;Lg; the realization of (~ sn)n2N is commonly observable. Uncertainty en-
ters the economy via the agents' endowments. The (date 1) endowment of agent
n is ~ wn = w(~ sn); let wH ´ w(H);wL ´ w(L) be the agent's endowment in, re-
spectively, the idiosyncratic state H and state L. Each agents also undertakes
a (possibly) unobservable action - we will refer to it as e®ort - which a®ects the
probability of the realization of his idiosyncratic shock. There are two possible
e®ort levels a;b; let ¼(e) be the probability of the realization s = H given the
e®ort level e 2 fa;bg:
Agents' preferences are represented by a (Von Neumann - Morgenstern) utility
function of the following form:
¼(e)ln(c
H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))ln(c
L) ¡ v(e)
where (cH;cL) denotes consumption respectively in state H and L, c ´ (cH;cL),
and v(e) denoted the disutility of e®ort e.3
We assume that:
¼(a) > ¼(b); v(a) > v(b); w
H > w
L > 0
so that a is the `high' e®ort and H is the 'good' state.
Let - be the set of parameter values (v(a);v(b);¼(a);¼(b);wH;wL) of the econ-
omy which satisfy the above assumptions and the additional condition that at the
incentive constrained Pareto optima (see Bisin-Guaitoli (1998) for the standard
de¯nition) agents undertake the high e®ort level, e = a.
2.1. Competitive Equilibria
Competitive equilibria are characterized by the following market structure: every
agent has access to a complete set of pure contingent claims conditional on his
idiosyncratic uncertainty. In particular, and without loss of generality, two secu-
rities are available for trade, the ¯rst paying o® one unit of the consumption good
in state H, and the second paying o® one unit in state L.
In the benchmark case of symmetric information (when the e®ort level e chosen
by each agent is observed) the de¯nition of competitive equilibrium can be written
3The assumption of logarithmic utility is included just to simplify the calculations in the
proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 4, but is by no means essential.
5as follows. Let qe(s) denote the (linear) price of the security paying o® in state s
for agents choosing e®ort e.4
De¯nition 1. A competitive equilibrium with symmetric information 5 is given
by prices (qe(s);e = a;b; s = H;L), allocations and e®ort (cH;cL;e), such that:
(i) (cH;cL;e) solves the agent's optimization problem
max(cH;cL)2<2
+;e2fa;bg ¼(e)ln(c
H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))ln(c











H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))(c
L ¡ w
L) = 0 (2.2)
Both in the budget constraint and in the market clearing condition we have
used the fact that the level of trade in the security which pays o® is state
s 2 fH;Lg equals the excess demand in the same state, (cs ¡ ws).
For economies with asymmetric information (i.e. e®ort e is un-observable), we
will consider two cases with regard to the possible forms of the pricing functional.
The ¯rst is the case in which prices allow for a bid-ask spread but are otherwise
linear. To de¯ne competitive equilibria in this set-up some additional notation is
needed. Let q+(H) and q¡(H) denote respectively the buying and selling price of
the security paying o® in state H; q+(L) and q¡(L) denote the buying and selling
prices of the security paying o® in state L occurs. Let (x)+ denote max(0;x) and
(x)¡ denote min(0;x).
4By allowing the prices of the securities whose payo® is contingent to idiosyncraticuncertainty
to depend on the e®ort level, we e®ectively allow agents to trade a complete set of securities
with payo® contingent on the uncertainty and the e®ort level.
5We limit our attention here to symmetric equilibria. On the other hand, if the agents'
choice problem is not convex (as later for economies with asymmetric information), symmetric
equilibria may not exist. In such cases we will have to exploit the large number of agents to
convexify, allowing for the possibility that agents will make di®erent choices at equilibrium; the
de¯nition of competitive equilibria can be easily extended to these situations, at only notational
costs.
6As standard in these set-ups, we appeal to the law of large numbers to identify ¼(e) with
the fraction of agents whose endowment realization is wH:
6De¯nition 2. A competitive equilibrium with asymmetric information and bid-
ask spreads is given by a pair of (bid and ask) prices for each of the two states,
(q+(s);q¡(s);s = H;L) and a vector (cH;cL;e); such that:
(i) (cH;cL;e) solves the agent's optimization problem
max(cH;cL)2<2
+;e2fa;bg ¼(e)ln(c
H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))ln(c





















H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))(c
L ¡ w
L) = 0 (2.4)
The second case we consider with regard to the form of the pricing functional is
the case in which arbitrary non-linear prices are allowed. Let q(cH ¡wH;cL¡wL)
denote a general non-linear function mapping trades into their value. We then
have:
De¯nition 3. A competitive equilibrium with asymmetric information and non-
linear prices is given by a map q : <2 ! < and a vector (cH;cL;e); such that:
(i) (cH;cL;e) solves the agent's optimization problem
max(cH;cL)2<2
+;e2fa;bg ¼(e)ln(c
H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))ln(c









H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))(c
L ¡ w
L) = 0 (2.6)
2.2. Strategic Equilibria
We present here the strategic equilibrium notion we shall consider in this pa-
per. Assume now the economy is also populated by I ¯nancial intermediaries.
Each intermediary i = 1;:::;I can issue Ji contracts (securities), indexed by
7ji = 1;:::;Ji; Ji is assumed given, and large7. Let J ´
P
i Ji; also, we let J;Ji
denote the sets of contracts which can be issued as well as their cardinality. A
contract is identi¯ed by a vector of (possibly negative) payo®s paid by the interme-
diary to the buyer of the contract, conditionally on the realization of the publicly
observable characteristics of the agent trading the contract. More precisely, when
e®ort is unobservable, a contract j is a pair dj = (dj;H;dj;L) describing the payo®
respectively in state H and L:
Given the set of contracts issued by all intermediaries, agents choose which
contracts to enter and which e®ort level to undertake; their consumption level is
then uniquely determined by their choice of contracts. Perfectly anticipating the
agents' choices, as a function of the set of contracts available to them, intermedi-
aries strategically choose which contracts to issue, so as to maximize pro¯ts.
With regard to the information available to intermediaries over agents ' trades
three cases will be considered:
1. Non observability of trades: each intermediary cannot observe any of the
trades an agent makes with other intermediaries, nor whether agents engage
in re-trading fractions or multiples of the contracts they purchased (or sold)
from them. Thus intermediaries can only separate the buying and selling
positions of each agent in their own contracts.
2. Non observability of other trades: each intermediary cannot observe any of
the trades an agent makes with other intermediaries, nor whether agents
engage in re-trading fractions of the contracts they purchased (or sold) from
them. Thus intermediaries can in this case also impose an upper bound on
the trades of each agent in their own contracts.
3. Complete observability of trades: each intermediary is able in this case to
perfectly monitor all the transactions an agent makes, and hence to imple-
ment exclusive contracts. Each agent can only choose to buy one of the J
contracts available to him.
It is notationally convenient to de¯ne equilibria for asymmetric information
economies ¯rst.
7The fact that intermediaries are required to issue no less than Ji contracts is clearly not
restrictive, since the trivial contract with zero payo® is assumed to be always an available choice.
8In the case of no observability of trades, letting f¸jigji2Ji;i2I denote the agent's
portfolio choices, the problem solved by agents, given the set of contracts d ´




H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))ln(c







ji;s; s 2 fH;Lg
Note that the portfolio choices of each agent are restricted to be non-negative.
This is without loss of generality because the intermediaries can distinguish the
buying and selling positions of each agent, and selling positions can also be de-
scribed as buying positions of contracts with negative payo®s.







ji;H + (1 ¡ ¼(e))d
ji;L]¸jig s. t. (2.7)






Thus intermediaries play a simultaneous game where the choice variable is the
menu of contracts they issue.
De¯nition 4. An equilibrium with strategic intermediaries and no observability
of trades is then an array f(¸;e;c);dg such that:
(i) (¸;e;c) solves problem (P) given d;
(ii) (dji)ji2Ji solves (2.7) given (dji0
)ji02Ji0;i0 6= i:
In the case of no observability of other trades, the agents' problem, given the
set of contracts d ´ (dji)j2Ji;i2I issued by intermediaries, is:
max¸2[0;1]J;e2fa;bg;c2<2
+ ¼(e)ln(c
H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))ln(c







ji;s; s 2 fH;Lg
where agents' portfolio in each security j is restricted to the set [0;1], because the
intermediary can impose an upper bound (with no loss of generality set equal to
9one) on trades in its own contracts. The intermediaries' choice problem is then
obtained by a straightforward reformulation of the one above, replacing (P) with
(P0) in (2.7). The formal de¯nition of an equilibrium with no observability of other
trades is similarly obtained from De¯nition 4 by replacing (P) with (P 0).
Finally, in the case of complete observability of trades, the agents' problem,
given the set of contracts d ´ (dji)j2Ji;i2I, is :
max¸2f0;1gJ;e2fa;bg;c2<2
+ ¼(e)ln(c
H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))ln(c
L) ¡ v(e) s. t. (P00)










ji;s; s 2 fH;Lg
The speci¯cation of the intermediaries' choice problem and the formal de¯nition of
an equilibrium with strategic intermediaries and complete observability of trades
are again obtained by replacing (P) with (P00) respectively in (2.7) and De¯nition
4.
For economies with symmetric information, since e®ort e is observable, inter-
mediaries are allowed to index the payo® of the contracts they o®er to e. We can
then capture the di®erent assumptions on observability of trades with the same
restrictions as above on the choice of ¸j, for all j.
The problem solved by agents, given the set of contracts d ´ (dji)j2Ji;i2I issued
by intermediaries, can then be formally described as follows:
max¸2¤;e2fa;bg;c2<2
+ ¼(e)ln(c
H) + (1 ¡ ¼(e))ln(c







ji;s;e; s 2 fH;Lg;e 2 fa;bg
where ¤ corresponds to <J
+, [0;1]J,
©
¸j 2 f0;1g; 8j : ¸ji = 1 ) ¸j0i0 = 0; 8j0i0 6= jiª
,
respectively, for the case of no observability of trades, no observability of other
trades, and complete observability of trades.







ji;H + (1 ¡ ¼(e))d
ji;L]¸jig s. t. (2.8)
10(e;(¸ji)ji2Ji) solves problem (P





0 6= i] and
The de¯nition of equilibrium under the di®erent assumptions on observability of
trades for economies with symmetric information are a straightforward extension
of those for economies with asymmetric information.
3. Convergence
We begin by showing that convergence always holds when information is symmet-
ric (i.e. e®ort is commonly observable), for each of the above possible assumptions
about the observability of trades.
Proposition 1. When e®ort is publicly observable, there exists a unique com-
petitive equilibrium, where all agents undertake the high level of e®ort and fully





For I su±ciently large, equilibria with strategic intermediaries, for all the assump-
tion on observability of trades, are characterized by the same allocations.
The existence (and in fact the Pareto optimality) of such equilibria is immedi-
ate, given the simple structure of the economy. Similarly, convergence follows by
a standard ('Bertrand-like') argument: as long as I ¸ 2 intermediaries will always
choose to issue contracts o®ering full insurance, conditionally on high e®ort, at
fair prices, and no other contract will be traded.
When e®ort is privately observed strategic equilibria with complete observabil-
ity of trades do converge to competitive equilibria with asymmetric information
and non-linear prices.
Proposition 2. Thereexists a unique, incentive e±cient, competitive equilibrium9
with non-linear prices where all agents undertake the high level of e®ort and
achieve partial insurance. For I su±ciently large, all equilibria with strategic
intermediaries and complete observability of trades also support the same alloca-
tion.





and no trade on the contracts contingent on a high level of e®ort. Such equilibria though are
not robust to any re¯nement in the spirit of trembling hand perfection (see Gale (1992)).
9In this case too other equilibria with non-linear prices exist. However, only the incentive
e±cient equilibrium satis¯es a `trembling hand' re¯nement; see again Gale (1992).
11Proof. Let e(cH ¡ wH;cL ¡ wL) be the map describing the agents' optimal
choice of e®ort, for any possible level of net trades. In the framework of the
economy under examination, this map is well-de¯ned and single-valued (except
at one point where agents' are indi®erent in the e®ort choice). Consider then
the pricing functional q
¡
e(cH ¡ wH;cL ¡ wL)
¢
; it is immediate to see that this
pricing functional constitutes a competitive equilibrium with nonlinear prices, and
decentralizes the incentive e±cient allocation. Turning next to the equilibrium
with strategic intermediaries, by a similar argument as in Proposition 1, as long as
there are I > 2 intermediaries, they will always choose to issue exclusive contracts
o®ering partial insurance, at the incentive e±cient level, and inducing a high level
of e®ort.
We will show next that strategic equilibria with no observability of trades
do converge to competitive equilibria with asymmetric information and bid-ask
spreads. For this, we consider ¯rst what are the properties of competitive equi-
libria with bid-ask spreads. It should be clear, given the simple structure of the
economy and the speci¯cation of contracts available to agents, that competitive
equilibria with bid-ask spreads, if they exist, can only be of the following three
types:
1. equilibria with low e®ort and full insurance (i.e. cH = cL = ¼(b)wH + (1 ¡
¼(b))wL); purchased at the fair price q¡(H) = ¼(b);q+(L) = 1 ¡ ¼(b);
2. equilibria with no trade and high e®ort (i.e. cH = wH;cL = wL;e = a);
3. 'mixed' equilibria, where a fraction of the agents in the population exert
high e®ort, while the others exert low e®ort, and both buy insurance, at the




cL(a)¡wL ); though in
di®erent amounts.
In Bisin and Gottardi (1997) it is shown that a competitive equilibrium always
exists in this set-up, and a complete characterization is provided of the set of
equilibria for the various regions of the parameter space -:
Proposition 3. For I su±ciently large, all strategic equilibria with no observ-
ability of trades are characterized by the same allocation as competitive equilibria
with bid-ask spread.
12Again, the proof follows by a simple `Bertrand competition' argument.
On the other hand, we will now show that when there is asymmetric infor-
mation and no observability of other trades, convergence to competitive equilib-
ria with bid-ask spread may not hold. In other words, when intermediaries can
impose an upper bound restriction on agents' trades with themselves, they can
exploit this restriction to produce a barrier to the entry of other intermediaries,
thereby obstructing convergence of strategic equilibria to competitive equilibria
with bid-ask spreads.
Note that the intermediaries' ability to construct barriers to entry by exploit-
ing their information on agents' trades vanishes in the limit for the number of
intermediaries I tending to in¯nity, in economies with symmetric information (as
shown in Proposition 1), as well as in economies with complete observability of
trades (Proposition 2). Moreover, in the class of economies with adverse selec-
tion studied by Bias-Martimort-Rochet (1997), barriers to entry also vanish in
the limit and the convergence to competitive equilibrium allocations with bid-ask
spreads obtain.
To show that convergence may fail in economies with no observability of other
trades, we focus our attention here on the equilibria for a subset of the parameter
space:
Lemma 1. There exists an open set of economies ¡ ½ - such that for any econ-
omy in ¡ the only competitive equilibria with bid-ask spreads are either equilibria
with no trade and high e®ort, or `mixed' equilibria.
Proof. The proof is immediate. Let ¡ = fv(a);v(b);¼(a);¼(b);wH;wL 2 - :
¼(b)(1 ¡ ¼(a))wH
¼(a)(1 ¡ ¼(b))wL < 1
v(a) ¡ v(b) ¡ ¼(a)ln(
¼(a)
¼(b)













H + (1 ¡ ¼(a))w
L¢
It is straightforward to check that ¡ 6= ;: The ¯rst inequality de¯ning ¡ implies
that, if agents' e®ort level is high, their optimal choice of trade in insurance
contracts, at the prices q¡(H) = ¼(b);q+(L) = 1 ¡ ¼(b);q+(H) = ¼(a);q¡(L) =
13¼(a); is zero (i.e. no trade). The second inequality then says that, at these prices,
agents prefer to exert a high level of e®ort (and hence a zero level of trade in
insurance contracts) to a low e®ort level, and the optimal level of trades in that
case, i.e. full insurance. Hence for economies in ¡ competitive equilibria with low
e®ort do not exist. Since, by the argument in Bisin and Gottardi (1997), we know
that competitive equilibria with bid-spreads always exist, we conclude that only
no trade equilibria with high e®ort, or `mixed' equilibria, exist in this region.
The following result then shows that for an open set of economies having a non-
empty intersection with the set of economies whose competitive equilibria have
been characterized in Lemma 1, and for I large, no equilibrium with strategic
intermediaries and no observability of other trades can be `close' to any of the
competitive equilibria with bid-ask spread, i.e. that convergence does not hold.
More precisely:
Proposition 4. For an open subset of economies no equilibrium with strategic
intermediaries and no observability of other trades converges, for I ! 1, to a
competitive equilibrium with bid ask spreads.
Proof.
The proof is organized in four main steps.
In the ¯rst three steps the result is established for the case in which the agents'
admissible portfolio choices are restricted to lie in the set ¸ 2 f0;1gJ; i.e. agents
are not allowed to buy fractions of the contracts issued. Step 1 shows that there
is there is an open, non-empty subset ¡0 ½ - of economies, for each of which there
exists a non-empty set of consumption allocations (di®erent from the endowment
point) with the property that agents, at those allocations, prefer to exert the
high e®ort level and not to trade any contract o®ering supplemental insurance at
the rate
1¡¼(b)
¼(b) . Furthermore, we show that the intersection of ¡0 with the set ¡,
characterized in Lemma 1, is also non-empty and open.
In the rest of the argument it is shown that, for all economies in ¡0, all the
Nash equilibria with strategic intermediaries are di®erent, for I large enough, both
from the no trade equilibria with high e®ort and the `mixed' equilibria. Since, by
Lemma 1, the competitive equilibria with bid-ask spread of all economies in ¡ can
only be of either of these two types, it follows that, for all economies in ¡\¡0; no
strategic equilibrium converges to a competitive equilibrium with bid-ask spreads.
14In Step 2 it is shown that for all economies in ¡ \ ¡0; a zero level of trade
(with high e®ort) cannot be an equilibrium with strategic intermediaries, if I
is su±ciently large. This will be established by proving that at the no trade
allocation there are contracts, which if o®ered, would lead the agents to a strictly
preferred allocation (i.e. would be accepted) and would make positive pro¯ts.
Thus there exists a pro¯table deviation, so the no trade allocation cannot be
supported as an equilibrium. The complication in the argument comes from the
fact that we have to show that pro¯table deviations exist even in the presence of
`latent contracts', i.e. non-trivial contracts which are not traded at equilibrium,
but play a role in deterring entry, or the proposal of other contracts.10 In Step
3 it is then shown that the same result is true for the allocation at a 'mixed'
equilibrium.
Finally, in Step 4 we show that the result obtained above extends to the case
in which agents are allowed to trade fractions of the contracts o®ered, i.e. their
admissible portfolio choices lie in the set [0;1]:







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
cH ¡ wH
cL ¡ wL
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ·
1 ¡ ¼(b)
¼(b)
This is a section of a cone with vertex at the endowment point and boundary de-




¼(b) ; which go through
the endowment point (i.e. the zero pro¯t loci for high and low e®ort respectively);
see Figure 1. All contracts in A such that








positive pro¯ts if e = a; negative pro¯ts if e = b.
Denote then by B the set of pairs (cL;cH) ¸ 0 such that
¼(a)ln(c
H) + (1 ¡ ¼(a))ln(c
L) ¡ v(a) ¸ ln(¼(b)c
H + (1 ¡ ¼(b))c
L) ¡ v(b) (3.1)
This region identi¯es the set of consumption allocations where agents prefer to
exert high e®ort, and are not willing to buy additional contracts, o®ering them
10Hellwig (1983) has ¯rst shown in a similar set-up how equilibrium allocations with high
e®ort level can be sustained by the presence of `latent contracts'. See Bisin-Guaitoli (1998) for
a characterization of such equilibria.











It can be easily veri¯ed that if the following condition holds:









the set B is a non-empty cone with vertex at the origin. Furthermore, the bound-
ary of B is given by two rays through the origin with slope ®1;®2; both strictly
greater than one, which are obtained as solutions of the equation:
expf¡(v(a) ¡ v(b)g(®)
¼(a) = (1 ¡ ¼(b)) + ¼(b)(®)
i.e. cH=cL 2 [®1;®2] ) (cL;cH) 2 B: See Figure 1.
Let ¡0 ½ - be de¯ned by the set of parameter values which satisfy (3.2) as
well as the following additional condition:
w
H=w
L > minf®1;®2g (3.3)
It is immediate to see that the set ¡0 is open, non-empty. Furthermore, for any
economy whose parameter values lie in ¡0 the subsets A and B of the space of
allocations described above have a non-empty intersection, which is di®erent from
the singleton set containing only the endowment point fwH;wLg. Recalling then
the characterization of the set ¡ given in Lemma 1, we can also say that for
any economy in ¡ the endowment point is an interior point of the set B; so that
A \ B 6= ;;A \ B ¾ fwH;wLg; hence any such economy also belongs to the set
¡0; or ¡ ½ ¡0:
Step 2. We will show ¯rst that, for all economies in ¡ \ ¡0, there is no equi-
librium in which all agents remain at their endowment point (i.e. there is no
trade). Since for such economies the endowment point belongs to the interior of
B, at a no trade allocation agents choose e®ort a: At any point of A\B (as in any
point of underinsurance) the agents' marginal rate of substitution is (in absolute
11If the agents were to buy these additional contracts, their optimal choice of e®ort would
obviously be e = b:
16value) greater than (1 ¡ ¼(a))=¼(a). Hence there are allocations, in the interior
of A \ B; which are strictly preferred by agents so that, if no other non-trivial
contract is issued, there are also contracts which if proposed would make positive
pro¯ts.
To complete the argument for this case we need to show that a pro¯table
deviation exists even if the no trade allocation obtains when `latent contracts'
are issued. Since the endowment point belongs to the interior of B, any contract
such that ¹ dj;H=¹ dj;L = ¡(1¡¼(b))=¼(b) is indeed a possible `latent' contract, as it
satis¯es the condition of not being traded at the endowment point. However such
contract will also not be traded at any other point in A\B; thus it cannot deter
the pro¯table deviation described above.












; is an admissible `latent' contract. If such











; for some small ² > 0; such
that agents strictly prefer to trade both contract (^ dj;H; ^ dj;L) and (~ dj;H; ~ dj;L); and
exert the low e®ort, so the intermediaries issuing (^ dj;H; ^ dj;L) would make nega-
tive pro¯ts (while those issuing (~ dj;H; ~ dj;L) make positive pro¯ts).12 Hence issuing
contract (^ dj;H; ^ dj;L) is not an optimal choice of an intermediary. On the other
hand if wH + ^ dj;H = wL + ^ dj;L there is always another contract, as we already
argued above, supporting an allocation in A \ B, which is strictly preferred by
the agent; hence issuing such a contract, rather than (^ dj;H; ^ dj;L); would allow the
intermediary to obtain higher (positive) pro¯ts. Note that this is true whether or
not the `latent' contracts with payo® (¹ dj;H; ¹ dj;L) are also issued. Moreover, even if
the contract (^ dj;H; ^ dj;L) is `split' among any ¯nite number13 of intermediaries each
issuing a fraction of it, a pro¯table deviation still exists. Any intermediary issuing
a fraction of the contract can in fact attain higher pro¯ts by issuing, instead of this
fraction, a properly selected contract supporting an allocation in A\B. This com-











are not admissible `latent' contracts.
12Take (~ dj;H; ~ dj;L) o®ering positive insurance at a rate slightly higher than (1 ¡¼(b))=¼(b) if
wH + ^ dj;H > wL + ^ dj;L; or negative insurance at a rate slightly lower than (1 ¡ ¼(b))=¼(b) if
wH + ^ dj;H < wL + ^ dj;L:
13We should point out that also in the limit case, when I = 1; the same conclusion holds,
though by a slighly di®erent argument.
17Step 3. We will show next that no equilibrium exists where a fraction of the
agents choose a high and the others a low level of e®ort, both buy insurance and





both lie on the same line, going through the endowment point (wH;wL)): Evi-
dently, in this case agents must be indi®erent between the two e®ort levels a;b












14: By essentially the same argument
as the one used in Step 2 we can show that if cH(b) 6= cL(b) a pro¯table devia-
tion (given by a contract o®ering additional positive, or negative, insurance at a







;² > 0) exists. If, on the other hand,
cH(b) = cL(b); there is always another allocation which is strictly preferred to
(cH(a);cL(a)) by agents making high e®ort15, i.e. a pro¯table deviation exists in
this case too. Hence no equilibrium with both levels of e®ort chosen exists either.
Step 4. Finally, we show that the result extends to the case in which trading
of fractions is also allowed. This follows immediately from the observation that
none of the pro¯table deviations we considered requires a minimum indivisible
quantity to be purchased by agents. The pro¯tability of a contract depends in
fact only on its rate
¯ ¯dj;H=dj;L¯ ¯; the maximal amount of insurance o®ered, and
the e®ort chosen by agents. And any consumption allocation strictly preferred to
the original candidate allocation would still be preferred to a convex combination
of the two.
As shown by Bisin and Guaitoli (1998), an equilibrium (possibly in mixed
strategies) with strategicintermediaries always exist; in particular, for alleconomies
in ¡\¡0 a pure strategy equilibrium with high e®ort and a nonzero level of trade







¼(b) ; the contracts would makepositive pro¯ts, but a pro¯table
deviation exists, given by contracts o®ering a slightly higher payo® in both states. When the
inequality holds in the opposite direction the contracts make negative pro¯ts.
15If (cH(a);cL(a)) = 2 A\B; agents strictly prefer to buy additional insurance, at a rate
1¡¼(b)
¼(b) :





to move slightly upward and to the right in the region A\ B, and ¯nd so an allocation strictly
preferred to (cH(a);cL(a)).
18imply that mixed strategy equilibria cannot converge, for the number of interme-
diaries I going to in¯nity, to degenerate equilibria with with no trade, or mixed
equilibria with both e®ort levels chosen.
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